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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC . ) 
SUPPLY COMPANY, • 
) 
Plain tiff-Appellant, 
) ' 
v s . 
) Case No. 14040 
SKYLINE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corpora t ion , ) 
and GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA, a ) 
corpora t ion , 
) 
• Defendants-Respondents . 
) 
-and-
) 
PAUL W. LARSEN CONTRACTOR, 
I N C . , ) 
Defendant. ) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Sta tement of Fac t s p resen ted by the Appellant and the Statement 
of F a c t s p resen ted by the Respondents p r i m a r i l y vary in the period of time 
covered by the S ta tements . Since this appeal is concerned only with the i s sue 
of whether the t r i a l court should have d i smis sed plaintiff 's Complaint for failure 
to p rosecu te , plaintiff only included in i ts Sta tement of F a c t s the ma te r i a l devel-
opments f rom the time of the commencement of the lawsuit through the granting 
of defendants ' Motion. Obviously, what o c c u r r e d p r io r to 1972 when the Com-
plaint was ini t iated is not significantly m a t e r i a l to the cour t ' s decision of the 
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respons ib i l i t i e s of the respec t ive pa r t i e s in moving the case toward the t r ia l 
s t age . Consequently, the r eco rd on appeal does not include many facts pe r -
taining to years 1970, 1971, and 1972, p r io r to the commencement of l i t igation 
as such facts would be wholly i m m a t e r i a l and i r r e l e v a n t to the i s sues here 
involved. N e v e r t h e l e s s , Defendant-Respondents have spent a substant ia l 
portion of thei r brief d i scuss ing the act ions of the plaintiff and defendants 
p r io r to the commencement of the lawsui t . The re fo re , Appellant feels a nece s -
sity to respond and clarify some of the facts rel ied on by defendants in Respon-
dents1 Brief. 
During the yea r s 1970 and 1971 defendants Skyline and L a r s e n purchased 
l a r g e amounts of e l ec t r i ca l products from Westinghouse E l ec t r i c Supply Company 
which requ i red shipments f rom var ious b ranches of the world-wide operat ions 
of Appellant1 s opera t ions for use on a public construct ion job. These products 
w e r e del ivered from all pa r t s of the country. Most i t ems were shipped inde-
pendently to the job from the respec t ive plant where the product was manufactured. 
In the spring of 1970, L a r s e n became slow in some of his payments and Westing-
house requ i red Skyline to make payments both to Larsen and the plaintiff. T h e r e -
af ter , the m a t e r i a l s purchased were approved by and o rde red by Skyline !s 
off icers , agents and employees on Skyline 's own account . Although the account 
balance var ied at different t imes during the year 1970, as of July 14, 1971, there 
was a balance owing of $41 , 357. 32, of which over half per ta ined to purchases 
d i rec t ly made by defendant Skyline and the balance was purchased by defendant 
L a r s e n as a sub -con t r ac to r of Skyline. (R. 116-117) When suit was filed, it 
was unders tood by plaintiff that Respondent Skyline would set t le the account 
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without the necess i ty of prolonged l i t igat ion. Unknown to plaintiff at that 
t ime was the se r ious financial condition of both L a r s e n and Skyline, which 
consequently resul ted in both of them terminat ing their bus inesses before the 
end of 1972. As the resu l t of both bus inesses failing, plaintiff has been required 
to look to the bonding company, Genera l Insurance Company, to pay for the 
obligations i ncu r r ed by the defunct companies L a r s e n and Skyline. Until that 
point there was not a p rob lem of defendants having sufficient invoices and 
documentat ion to account for plaintiff 's c laim because copies of al l invoices 
and monthly s ta tements had been regu la r ly sent to the defendants L a r s e n and 
Skyline during the course of construct ion and when the purchases were made . 
However , the defendant insurance company did not personal ly have i ts copies 
of the r e spec t ive invoices . As of September 1973 when Respondents filed their 
answer in this m a t t e r , defendant General Insurance Company had been provided 
with l i s t s of all payments that had been made and copies of all unpaid invoices 
in connection with this m a t t e r . (R. 56) In September 1973 defendants filed a 
r eques t for production of additional documents . (R. 60-61) 
This factual background is impor tan t because Respondents ' brief weighs 
heavily on m a t t e r s that per ta ined to t ime p r io r to when defendants filed their 
answer or before they ever filed a reques t for production of documents . Appel-
lant bel ieves that any time p r io r to September 1973 is wholly i r r e l e v a n t and 
i m m a t e r i a l to the i s s u e s before this court . If there was any prejudice that was 
i ncu r r ed by any of the defendants pr ior to September 1973, it was solely as the 
r e s u l t of respondent Genera l Insurance Company 's own fai lure to act , knowing 
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that Skyline and L a r s e n were going out of bus ines s . The fact that defendants 
Skyline and L a r s e n went out of bus iness was not known to plaintiff until 
August 14, 1973. (Record 74, 75) 
The period of t ime re levant to the cour t ' s considerat ion is that t ime 
between August 1973 and Janua ry 1975. The events that occur red during that 
period a r e as follows: 
August 14, 1973 - plaintiff was informed that defendants Pau l L a r s e n 
Con t rac to r , Inc . was in r e c e i v e r s h i p and that Skyline Construct ion Company 
had made an as s ignment for the benefit of c r e d i t o r s . (R. 74-75) 
August 20, 1973 - the court heard defendants ' Motion to D i smis s and 
ruled that plaintiff mus t amend i ts Thi rd Cause of Action in i ts Complaint to 
se t forth the date the l a s t m a t e r i a l was supplied. (R. 66) 
August 21 , 1973 - plaintiff files amendment to Complaint . 
Sep tember 10, 1973 - respondents file Request for Product ion of 
Documents . (R. 60-61) 
Sep tember 10, 1973 - plaintiff 's counsel submits to respondents ' counsel 
45 invoices per ta ining to the L a r s e n account and 57 invoices pertaining to the 
Skyline Construct ion account. (R. 56) 
October 1973 through Apr i l 1974 - plaintiff conducted s ea r ches through 
i ts a r c h i v e s , r e c o r d deposi tory , and branch , regional , and national offices to 
obtain the voluminous nunaber of documents reques ted by defendants. (R. 36) 
May 1974 - plaintiff informed Respondents ' counsel ' s office of the ava i l -
abil i ty of documents and r eco rds at plaintiff 's offices. (R. 36-37) 
July 15, 1974 - plaintiff again informed Respondents ' counse l ' s office 
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of the avai labi l i ty of the reques ted documents . (R. 37) 
October 1974 - plaintiff p repa red Requests for Admiss ions , In t e r -
r o g a t o r i e s , and Motions to Produce to be served upon defendants at such 
t imes as defendants reviewed documents gathered by plaintiff. (R. 48-49) 
J a n u a r y 6, 1975 - defendants filed Motion to D i smi s s for failure of 
prosecut ion . (R. 50-51) 
During the period from September 1973 to J anua ry 1975 the record 
i s totally devoid of any effort whatsoever on the pa r t of the defendants to take 
any action on the case o r any efforts to follow up on the Request for Product ion 
of Documents to inquire about the production of documents or to seek a court 
o r d e r to compel production of documents . 
ARGUMENT 
PROPOSITION: UNDER ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING 
THE PLAINTIFF 'S COMPLAINT. 
Respondents cite three cases upon which they re ly to es tab l i sh that 
the Di s t r i c t Court did not abuse i t s d iscre t ion in d i smiss ing the action. Each 
of these three ca se s can be c lea r ly dist inguished upon the facts from the case 
at ba r . In the case of B r a s h e r Motor and Finance Co. v. Brown, (1969) 23 
Utah 2d 247, 461 P . 2d 464, a replevin action for automobiles had been filed 
and the defendants filed a Counte rc la im. Five and one-half years elapsed with-
out e i ther pa r ty taking any act ion. At the end of the five and one-half year 
period the cour t on i t s own motion d i smi s sed the Complaint and the Counter-
c la im. The decision was affirmed on the bas is that the t r i a l court had acted 
with judicial p ropr ie ty , looking to the i n t e r e s t s of all l i t igants and the in t e re s t 
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of the cour t in the s i tuat ion. The Supreme Cour t agreed that Rule 41 had 
no application in the case , but held that the cour t had the inherent authori ty 
to d i s m i s s under the facts of the case . 
The second case cited by the defendant is Food Basket , Inc. v. Alber t -
, s o n ' s , Inc. (D. C. Utah 1 969), x4l6 F . 2d 937, in which the Hon. Will is Ri t te r 
d i s m i s s e d an a n t i - t r u s t suit where the plaintiff had failed to file an amended 
complaint for a lmos t a year after the plaintiff had been authorized to do so by 
the appel la te cour t . Judge Ri t te r had previously granted s u m m a r y judgment 
agains t the plaintiff, which decision was appealed and r e v e r s e d by the appellate 
cour t , allowing the plaintiff to amend i ts complaint to c o r r e c t technica l i t ies . 
When plaintiff failed to so act for near ly a year , the m a t t e r was d i smissed for 
fai lure to p rosecu te . Whether one a g r e e s or d i sag rees with Judge R i t t e r ' s 
action in this m a t t e r , i t cannot be denied that the fact situation is completely 
foreign to that be fo re this court and is cer ta in ly not a sound precedent upon 
which Respondents can re ly . 
The third case Respondents re ly on to show the Dis t r i c t Cour t did not 
a) 
abuse i ts d i scre t ion i s a Nevada case that is not at all in point./ In that case 
the plaintiff failed to se rve the summons on the defendant doctor and the defen-
dant hospi ta l for over two y e a r s . Consequently, the court had the power under 
the Nevada Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e to d i smiss plaintiff 's complaint . That, case 
i s guided by the ru les of p rocedure not applicable to this cour t . It involved a 
case in which the defendants had no duty to ac t because they had not been served 
with the pleadings requir ing them to appear in their own defense. 
In con t ra s t to the three ca ses re l ied upon by Respondents , the case at 
bar involves a situation in which the appellant was taking affirmative action in 
(1) Hasse t t v. St. Mary ' s Hospital A s s o c . Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the case while respondents were holding back any efforts to proceed. During 
the t ime between the filing of defendants ' Answer and filing of the Motion to 
D i s m i s s , plaintiff had taken seve ra l positive steps as more specifically out-
lined in the Sta tement of F a c t s , which included providing cer ta in documents 
"to the defendants and making available a substant ia l number of documents for 
review and copying. * 
The applicable law seems to be mos t co r rec t ly stated in Crys ta l Lime 
and Cement Company v. Robbins, 8 Ut 2d 380, 335 P . 2d 624 (1959) which 
places some affirmative respons ib i l i t i es on both plaintiff and defendant to 
br ing a case to a conclusion. In Howard v. Howard, 11 Ut 2d 149, 356, (I960) 
the Supreme Court cited with approval the Crys ta l Lime case (infra), placing 
a mutual respons ib i l i ty on both plaintiff and defendant to notice up motions and 
take appropr ia t e act ions within a case . 
The hea r t of the case seems to be centered in the fact that defendant 
Skyline Construct ion Company and defendant L a r s e n went out of bus iness , thus 
leaving the burden and responsib i l i ty of the case in the hands of the General 
Insu rance Company. F o r some reason General Insurance Company did not 
seek to obtain from i t s insured or i ts i n su red ' s subcont rac tors copies of the 
invo ices . The insurance company instead sought to place the burden and respon 
sibil i ty of providing said voluminous documentation upon the plaintiff. During 
this period of t ime, Genera l Insurance Company was aware of the financial 
fai lure of its insured . Equity will not allow General Insurance Company to 
stand by without taking any action as i ts insured t e rmina tes its business and 
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then c la im that because their i n s u r e d ' s bus iness has folded i t does not now 
have a c c e s s to the information n e c e s s a r y to put on a proper defense of the 
sui t . The in su rance company c la ims that since the employees a r e now 
employed by other ent i t ies that they have been unduly prejudiced. The facts 
a r e that Skyline and L a r s e n went out of bus iness in October 1972 and the 
insu rance company knew this and could have taken deposit ions or obtained 
documents from their insured or invoked the r emed ie s of Rule 37 to speed 
the. d i scovery p r o c e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , they chose not to even inform plaintiff 
of said bus iness fai lure until August 1973 and made no effort to expedite the 
a t t empts of plaintiff to acqui re duplicate documentation from i ts var ious 
offices. Not once after filing the Request for Product ion did the Respondents 
make any inquiry of plaintiff 's counsel concerning said documents . Not once 
did they make a telephone ca l l . Not once did they file a motion with the court 
asking for cour t sanct ions in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e . 
Not once did they make any effort to obtain those documents . If they had made 
any effort they would have been aware of the exis tence of those documents as 
of May 1974. They would have been aware of the telephone cal ls made to their 
office to advise them of the exis tence of the documents . 
The respondents fur ther c la im that appel lant was responsible for the 
delay in the case as the r e su l t of i ts not being more specific in i ts Answers to 
I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s submit ted by defendant L a r s e n . It is in te res t ing to note that the 
I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s were not subinitted by ei ther of the Respondents in this case , but 
by the o ther par ty who i s not par t of this appeal . At no time did the defendant 
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i n su rance company of the defendant Skyline submit any In t e r roga to r i e s nor 
did any par ty object to the specificity of the Answer s to In t e r roga to r i e s given 
by West inghouse. The facts a r e that said information reques ted was specifically 
and fully answered and defendants were provided the s ta tement of charges and 
c red i t s which was inadver tent ly left off the cour t ' s file copy. In any case , Re -
spondents never objected to the inadequacy of said Answers until the Respon-
dents ' brief in this appeal . 
Innuendos throughout Respondents ' brief infer facts that a r e completely 
incons i s ten t with the r eco rd . Respondents c la im that L a r s e n purchased the 
goods f rom plaintiff, not the responden t s . (Respondents ' Brief P . 12). It is 
t rue that respondent Genera l Insurance Company did not make the purchase , 
but $22, 000. 00 of the unpaid amount was purchased by the respondent Skyline. 
On page 13 of Respondents ' brief, they charge plaintiff with sca t te r ing i ts r eco rds 
throughout i ts b ranch , regional , and national offices when respondents knew very 
well that goods were received from various branch , regional , and national 
offices of plaintiff corpora t ion . The Salt Lake City office of Westinghouse is 
only a dis t r ibut ion center and the various i t ems were o rde red from plants all 
over the country specia l iz ing in the manufacturing of the par t s reques ted . Each 
individual plant inaintained its own invoices and r e c o r d s . Westinghouse personnel 
had to spend the t ime to go through its r e c o r d s and invoices and gather the r e l e -
vant documentation and t r an smi t it to the Salt Lake City office. (R. 36-39). 
The respondent r a i s e s a smokesc reen by inferr ing that documents were r e -
quested for many y e a r s , when, in fact, the documents reques ted pr ior to 
Sep tember 1973 were provided in September 1973. (R. 56) It was the documents 
that were not reques ted until September 1973 that were delayed for severa l months 
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because of the problem of gathering said documents . The suggested delay 
p r i o r to September 1973 when defendants f i r s t answered plaintiff 's Complaint 
a r e not m a t e r i a l to the i s sue s of this appeal . The broad scope of m a t e r i a l s 
purchased requ i red extensive work in gathering such r e c o r d s from the var ious 
b ranch , regional , and national a rch ives for the benefit of the respondent i n s u r -
ance company. * 
On page 22 of their brief, respondents t ry to infer a lack of diligence 
on the pa r t of the plaintiff for the fai lure to take d iscovery from defendant 
L a r s e n o r take judgment agains t defendant L a r s e n . Such a point is obviously 
i r r e l e v a n t because al l pa r t i e s know that the i s sue s he re a r e between appellant 
and the responden t ' s in su rance company because the o ther defendants a r e out of 
bus iness and unable to answer for the debts of the company. It is the respondent 
i n su rance company that is trying to ignore its respons ib i l i ty as an i n s u r e r under 
the cloak of being uninformed, while d i s r ega rd ing the facts that the requested 
information is fully within the knowledge and understanding of i t s own insured or 
i ts i n s u r e d ' s subcon t rac to r . 
The very reason that s tate law r equ i r e s bonding companies be involved 
in ca se s like this is to pro tec t the i n t e r e s t s of bus ines ses in the s ta tus of appellant 
from the bus iness fa i lures of c o n t r a c t o r s . F o r the insurance company now to try 
to get out of i ts insurance respons ib i l i t i es under the theory that the defunct 
company ' s employees will not cooperate with i t , begs the en t i re i s sue of the 
case and should not be an escape mechan i sm which allows insurance companies 
out of thei r duties to injured p a r t i e s . To rule for the i n s u r e r in this case would 
m e r e l y encourage insu rance companies in cases of c lear l iabil i ty to 
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refuse to take d i scovery p r o c e d u r e s , take deposi t ions , o r p r epa re cases 
in the hope that they might preva i l under the technical i ty of lack of cooper-
ation due to delays in getting a case to t r i a l . 
The obvious bas i s of any power of the court to d i smis s for lack of 
prosecut ion l ies in a balance of the equitable pr inc ip les between the p a r t i e s . 
Without need for c i t a t ion , legal max ims es tab l i sh that one who seeks equity 
m u s t do equity and that one seeking equitable relief by the cour t submits h im-
self to the impos i t ion of such t e r m s as equitable pr inciples r equ i r e . In this 
case the respondent had sought the equitable relief of the court in seeking the 
cou r t ' s e x e r c i s e of d iscre t ion to prevent the plaintiff f rom prosecut ing their 
c la ims agains t the r e sponden t s . They base their c la im upon the p r emise that 
they were placed in an unfair, position as the r e su l t of a delay in de termining 
the exact amount of money owing to plaintiff. Respondents have never denied 
that there is some money owing to appel lants , but have only claimed that they 
w e r e unable to account for the p rec i se amount of money as a r e su l t of not being 
able to get the r e c o r d s from their own insured or the theoret ica l cooperation 
of thei r own i n s u r e d ' s employees or their i n s u r e d ' s subcont rac tor . The i n s u r -
ance company seeks equitable relief without accounting for their own total 
fai lure to take any action to help the case p r o g r e s s or get n e c e s s a r y information 
f rom the o ther defendants between the time they filed the Request for Product ion 
of Documents and the time they filed their Motion to D i s m i s s . The record is 
en t i r e ly devoid of any effort whatsoever on the par t of respondents to inquire 
concerning the s ta tus of the avai labi l i ty of the reques ted documents , which 
inquiry would have resolved this problem months before the time of the Motion 
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to D i s m i s s . The r eco rd is totally devoid of any effort on the par t of the 
defendant to seek any other court a s s i s t a n c e . The r eco rd is totally devoid 
of any effort on the pa r t of the respondents to take deposi t ions of employees 
o r to gather documents a l r eady in the hands of their employees and their 
employees 1 subcon t rac to r . The hea r t of this case is summed up in one 
sentence in respondents 1 brief when they indicate that m o r e impor tant than 
the months that e lapsed from the Complaint to the Motion a r e the opportun-
i t i e s each side had to move the case forward. Specifically, Respondents ' 
br ief s t a t e s : "Much m o r e impor tan t fac tors a r e the opportunity each side 
has to move the case forward, the conduct of each side in at tempting to do so, 
the r easons and justif ication given for the delay, and mos t impor tan t , the p r e -
judice resul t ing the re f rom. " (Brief of Respondents , p . 24-25). (Emphasis i s 
added). Plaintiff a g r e e s that this is the impor tan t factor . 
It is plaintiff 's contention that while plaintiff was making reasonable 
efforts to gather information and provide such information to the defendant, 
the defendant did absolute ly nothing after September 1973 until January 1975. 
Respondents took no act ion, despite the fact that during said period plaintiff had 
provided the 102 mos t re levant documents and was in the p rocess of obtaining 
the o t h e r s . There was a total fai lure of respondents to inqui re , wr i te a l e t t e r , 
make a phone cal l , or seek court a s s i s t ance during the re levant period of t ime. 
The respondent insu rance company took no act ion, knowing full, well the status 
of the i r own insu red and the degree if any of prejudice which they would suffer 
if they failed to adequately p r e p a r e for the c a s e . Equitable pr inciples will not 
allow them to s i t back and do nothing and then complain because of the delay that 
- 1 2 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has r e su l t ed . It is well es tabl ished basic law that one who seeks to invoke 
equitable pr inc ip les of the nature before this court mus t not claim relief on 
inequi t ies that have resu l ted through the i r own inaction. 
While respondents we re sitting back without action, plaintiff was 
going through extensive work in individual offices and plants throughout the 
country gather ing n e c e s s a r y r e c o r d s which should not have been neces sa ry to 
produce because they had previously been in the hands of the defendants other 
than the insurance company. During this period of time appellant was aff i rma-
tively act ing in the m a t t e r while respondents were totally inact ive . 
CONCLUSION 
The i s s u e before this cour t na r rows down to the s imple question of 
whether t he ' t r i a l cour t abused i ts d iscre t ion in applying pr inciples of equity 
and law in d i smis s ing the plaintiff 's case with pre judice . The positions of the 
pa r t i e s a r e very c l ea r . Appellant, because of the size of i t s operat ion, took an 
extended period of time to gather per t inent documentation which was beyond the 
t ime norma l ly expected in a l i t igation proceeding. The period of time from the 
production of documents r eques t in September 1973 until the availabil i ty of 
documents in May 1974 was not so extensive that it justified such a ha r sh remedy 
a s total d i s m i s s a l . The position of defendants L a r s e n and Skyline as defunct 
bus ines se s is p r i m a r i l y one of cooperat ing with the insu rance c a r r i e r who is 
respons ib le for the financial loss in this m a t t e r . The position of General In su r -
ance Company of A m e r i c a i s that of making up the financial loss of the bus inesses 
which failed to pay for over $40, 000. 00 of equipment which they received, used, 
and were paid for but for which they failed to pay the m a t e r i a l m e n . 
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Obviously, the i n t e r e s t s of L a r s e n and Skyline a r e considerably l e s s 
than the insu rance company 's since their bus iness fa i lures in 1972. This lack 
of i n t e r e s t does not r e l e a s e the insu rance c a r r i e r of the respons ib i l i t i es of the 
r i sk it a s s u m e d . Genera l Insurance Company cer ta in ly understood when they 
cont rac ted to take the insu rance r i sk that if the bus ines ses failed it would have 
to appear in their behalf to pro tec t agains t l o s s . They had the responsibi l i ty to 
invoke such controls for documentation or to insure employee cooperation as 
they deemed n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to justify their assuming the r i s k s involved. 
Mine &; Smel t e r Supply Co. v. Genera l Insurance Co. of Amer i ca , et a l , 24 Ut 2d 
330, 471 P . 2d 154 (1974). F o r them to now t ry to escape this duty because they 
o r their counsel failed to make any inquiry or any effort between September 1973 
and Janua ry 1975 to get such information which they deemed n e c e s s a r y does not 
consti tute the aff irmative action that is requi red when someone seeks to invoke 
pr inc ip les of equity by the court . If the t ime taken by plaintiff was longer than 
respondents des i r ed , the options before them were many: 
1. They could have obtained copies of the documents sought from their 
own insu red or their in su red subcont rac tor . 
2. They could have taken n e c e s s a r y deposi t ions . 
3. They could have sought the cour t ' s sanct ions under Rule 37, Utah 
Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e , to e i ther encourage a deadline for the documents or 
to have financial or o ther sanctions imposed on the plaintiff. 
4. They could have wri t ten a l e t t e r to the plaintiff asking for a time 
definite wherein said documents would be made avai lable . 
5. They could have placed a phone call to plaintiff 's counsel as ear ly as Ma 
1974 and found that the documents sought we re readi ly avai lable for examination. 
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6. They could have answered the telephone m e s s a g e s left for them 
by plaintiff 's counsel . . * 
Ignoring al l of the l e s s s t r ingent r e m e d i e s , respondents sought the 
h a r s h e s t remedy agains t the appellant , that of total s u m m a r y adjudication 
of plaintiff 's c la im in the hope that respondents would be re l ieved of the obli-
gation for which they had insured against the default. Natural ly , the la t te r 
choice had the g r ea t e s t long-range benefits for the defendant insurance com-
pany, but s t r ikes a t the face of equity, jus t ice , and fa i rness between the 
p a r t i e s . Respondent insurance company cannot palm off the responsibi l i ty 
for i ts fai lure to act under the guise that the appellant was taking longer to 
act than normal ly r equ i red . The purpose of an insurance company involve-
ment in a project of this nature is to pro tec t the i n t e r e s t of those in s imi la r 
posit ions to plaintiff agains t bus iness fa i lures such as Skyline and L a r s e n . 
F o r the insurance company now to come along and t ry to get out of their i n s u r -
ance respons ib i l i ty under the technical i t ies before this Court avoids the very 
hea r t of this m a t t e r and their respons ib i l i ty both in equity and law as an i n s u r e r . 
The very documents that respondent wants remain available for examin-
ation and responden t s ' pr incipal wi tnesses remain available for tes t imony. 
The only pe rmanen t injury that would r e su l t should this court r e v e r s e the t r ia l 
cou r t ' s position is the expense of these appellate proceedings . It would be fair , 
j u s t , and equitable for this court to r e v e r s e the t r ia l court and allow a quick 
t r i a l of the m a t t e r , r equ i r e the documents in plaintiff 's possess ion to be made 
immedia te ly avai lable for respondents ' examination and for an ear ly t r ia l to be 
- 1 5 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
se t with the t r i a l cour t empowered 
mines to be reasonab le in light of 
respectful ly reques t s the court to 
set for t r i a l upon the m e r i t s . 
1 to a s s e s s such costs as equity de t e r -
the delays in. this m a t t e r . Appellant 
take such action and o r d e r the case to be 
Respectfully submitted, 
HENRIKSEN, FAIRBOURN & TATE 
C. R. Henr iksen 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
320 South Fifth E a s t 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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